RECENT CRITICISM OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY.
By HON. WILLIAM H. TAFT,

Judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.'

Within the last four years, the Governors of five or more
states have thought it proper in official messages to declare
that the Federal courts have seized jurisdiction, not rightly
theirs and have exercised it to the detriment of the Republic,
and to urge their respective legislatures to petition Congress
for remedial action to prevent future usurpation. One legislature did present a memorial to Congress reciting the grievances of the people of its state against the Federal Judiciary
and asking a curtailment of the powers unlawfully assumed
by them.
The principal charge against the Federal courts, which an
examination of these documents discloses, is that they have
flagrantly usurped jurisdiction, first, to protect corporations
and perpetuate their many abuses, and second, to oppress and
destroy the power of organized labor.
These charges against the Federal Judiciary have not been
confined to messages from state Governors. They also come
from persons, who although not holding high office, have a
standing before the Bar which entitles them to respectful
attention. Much of what is found in the official communications I have referred to concerning the treatment of corporations by the Federal courts, has taken form from the articles
and addresses of the editor of the A:NiERICAN LAW REVIEW.
This gentleman, well-known as an able and prominent law text
writer, has given much attention to the Federal decisions on
corporate matters and has expressed his condemnation of
many of them in language that has lacked nothing in freedom,
emphasis or rhetorical figure.
1The above address delivered by Judge Taft, at the Annual Meeting of
the American Bar Association in August, and revised by him for publica.
tion, is here published with his permission.
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The one judicial system to which all the members of this
Association bear the same relation, is that of the United
States, and when I was honored with an invitation to address
them, it at once occurred to me that I might properly ask
their attention to a temperate discussion of the justice of
these criticisms.
I have since been oppressed with the thought that the
theme might with more propriety be left to one having no
official relation to the Federal courts, but circumstances have
prevented any change from my original impulse. I can only
hope that my recent admission to the inferior ranks of the
Federal Judiciary and my humble position therein will prevent
the suggestion that what is here to be said has anything in it
either of a personal defence, or of a quasi official character.
The opportunity freely and publicly to criticise judicial
action is of vastly more importance to the people than the
immunity of courts and judges from unjust aspersions and
attack. Nothing tends more to render judges careful in
their decisions and anxiously solicitous to do exact justice,
than the consciousness that every act of theirs is to be subjected to the intelligent scrutiny and candid criticism of their
fellow men. Such criticism is beneficial in proportion as it
is fair, dispassionate, discriminating and based on a knowledge of sound legal principles. The comments made by
learncd text writers and by the acute editors of the various law
reviews upon judicial decisions are therefore highly useful.
Such critics constitute more or less impartial tribunals of pro-'
fessional opinion before which each judgment is made to.stand
or fall on its merits, and thus exert a strong influence to secure
uniformity of decision.
But non-professional criticism also is by no means without
its uses, even if accompanied as it often is by a direct attack
upon the judicial fairness and motives of the occupants of the
Bench; for if the law is but the essence of common sense, the
protest of many average men may evidence a defect in a judicial conclusion though based on the nicest legal reasoning and
profoundest learning. The two important elements of moral
character in a judge are an earnest desire to reach a just con-
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clusion and courage to enforce it. In so far as fear of public
comment does not affect the courage of a judge but only spurs
him on to search his conscience and to reach the result which
approves itself to his inmost heart, such comment serves a
useful purpose. There are few men, whether they are judges
for life or for a shorter term, who do not prefer to earn and
hold the respect of all, and who can not be reached and made
tc pause and deliberate by hostile public criticism. In the
case of judges having a life tenure, indeed, their very indcpendence makes the right freely to comment on their decisions of
greater importance because it is the only practical and available instrument in the hands of a free people to keep such
judges alive to the reasonable demands of those they serve.
On -he other hand, the danger of destroying the proper
influence of judicial decisions, by creating unfounded prejudices against the courts, justifies and requires that un*ust
attacks shall be met and answered. Courts must ultimately
rest their defence upon the inherent strength of the opinions
they deliver as the ground for their conclusions, and must
trust to the calm and deliberate judgment of all the people as
their best vindication. But the Bar has much to do with the
formation of that opinion and a discussion before them may
sometimes contain suggestions which bear good fruit.
Many persons whose good opinion is a high compliment
regard the Federal Judiciary with so much favor that they
would deprecate a consideration of the criticisms already
stated, as likely to give an importance to them they do not
deserve. I cannot concur in this view. I believe that in
large sections of this country, there are many sincere and
honest citizens who credit all that has been said against the
Federal courts, and that it is of much importance that the
reasons for the existence of these criticisms and their injustice
be pointed out.
It is not unfair to those Governors who are the chief
accusers of the Federal Judiciary to say that they knew that
they were not speaking as they did, to unwilling ears. They
were merely putting into language the hostile feeling of certain of their constituents toward the Federal courts and, but
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for such feeling, the criticisms would hardly have been uttered.

It will, thcrefore, in a large measure account for such criticisms, if we account for the popular sentiment they were made
to satisfv.
It will be my endeavor, therefore, first to show that much,
if not all, of the present hostility to the Federal courts in certain parts of the country and among certain groups of the
people can be traced to causes over which those courts can
exercise no control, and is neces.,arily due to the character of
the jt,ridictihn %%ith which they are vested, and not to injustice in its exercise ; and, second, thatthe criticisms which such
hostility ha'4 engendered are in themselves without foundation.
The history of the Federal courts since their beginning is
full of intances where the exercise of their jurisdiction has
involved them in popular controversies and has brought down
upon them the bitter assaults of those unfavorably affected by
their decisions. Yet the event has justified their course and
shown the injustice of the attacks.
The Federal Constitution was framed to create a national
government with limited powers, and to mark the line between
its jurisdiction on the one hand, and that of the states and the
people on the other. By virtue of its eighth article, the state
courts and a fori-ori the Federal courts, were vested with
the p.)%-,e:- and charged with the duty in judicial cases arising
before them, of ignoring state laws in conflict with the Federal
Con-ztitution. By necessary implication, their obedience to the
fundamental law also required them to ignore Acts of Congress, which were so plainly in violation of the constitution
that even the necessary and high respect due to the construction by Congress of its own powers could not give such acts
the force of law.
The Federal Judiciary at once became the arbiter in the
first great political controversy of the United States and one
which is continually reappearing in various forms. The general language of the constitution required construction to apply
it to judicial cases arising in the organization and maintenance
of the government. The two parties which had engaged in
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heated controversy over the adoption of the covenant at all,
continued it over its narrow or broad interpretation. The
SLpreme Court in the beginning was made up largely of men
whose predilection was for a liberal construction and who
believed thoroughly in the national idea. This was soon
manifest in their decisions, which called down upon the court
the anathemas of the strict constructionists, whose great effort
it thereupon became to weaken the power of the judiciary.
It was attempted to control their independence by making
very wide the grounds for impeachment. The great Chief
Justice was constantly threatened with this fate by partisans,
and the attacks upon his alleged usurpations were frequent and
fierce.. Jefferson's severe words concerning the Federal Judiciary, now so often quoted by their latter day critics, were
written about 182o as the result of the decision, in Coliens v.
Virginia, reaffirming the power of the Supreme Court of the
United States to reverse the decision of the Supreme Court of
a state on the validity of a state law under the Federal Constitution. It is not surprising that he who had inspired the
Kentucky resolutions of 1798, declaring the right of a state
to decline compliance with a Federal law, deemed by it to
be in conflict with the fundamental compact, should regard
the Federalist Supreme Court, which itself asserted the right
finally to decide such a question, to be "a thief of jurisdiction."
Upon political questions, and such are those arising in the
construction of a political charter, there always have been and
always will be differences of opinion. There is frequently no
absolute standard, even a century after, in deciding the
abstract right of them. We must be content to abide the
result reached by the verdict and acquiescence of the people
whose interests were involved. Before this tribunal, the position of John Marshall and his associates on the Supreme
Bench has been vindicated, and the criticisms of Thomas
Jefferson have been refuted.
Beginning then as arbiters in a political conflict, and wielding similar powers until to-day, the Federal Judiciary have
never enjoyed immunity from hostile attack upon their con-
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duct or their motives. The great controversy over the fugitive slave law needs no recounting here. In the eyes of the
abolitionists, the Federal courts and their marshals were instruments 6f hell in enforcing the law, and yet there could not be
the slightest doubt that such a jurisdiction was plainly within
the constitution. The change of feeling toward the Federal
courts because of the change in their jurisdiction with respect to
the negro race, affords an apt illustration of how mere jurisdiction may affect the popular feeling toward a court. Before the
war, the Southern people had not looked with disfavor upon
courts, which did so much to preserve their property, while at
the same time the abolitionists regarded them with aversion.
After the war, when for the protection of the negro in his electoral and civil rights, the election and civil rights bills were
passed, and their enforcement was given to the Federal courts,
they became at the same time the objects of hatred and condemnation at the South and the great reliance of those who
had been abolitionists at the North. Now that both parties
have wisely decided to let the election problem work itself
out, and to await the local solution, which the results of fraud
and violence in -elections will compel, the feeling of hostility
at the South against the Federal Judiciary has greatly abated.
This is but one of many historical instances showing how
the Federal court,; may be subjected to the most severe criticism without just grounds, merely because of the character of
their jurisdiction. I come now to review the reasons why
their mere jurisdiction has created a deep impression in many
parts of the country that the evils due to corporations are
fostered by them.
The last two generations have witnessed a marvellous material development. It has been effected by the organization
and enforced co-operation of simple elements that for a long
time previous had been separately used. The organization of
powerful machines or of delicate devices by which the producing power of one man was increased fifty or one hundredfold
was, however, not the only step in this great progress. The
aim of all material civilization in its hard contest with nature
was the reduction of the cost of production, because thereby
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each man's day's work netted him more of the comforts
of life. Within the limits of efficient administration, the
larger the amount to be produced at one time and under one
management, the less the expense per unit. Therefore, the
aggregation of capital, the other essential element with labor
in producing anything, became an obvious means of securing
economy in the manufacture of everything. Corporations
had long been known as convenient commercial instruments
for securing and wielding efficiently such aggregations of
capital. Charters were at first conferred by special act upon
particular individuals and with varying powers, but so great
became the advantage of incorporation with the facility
afforded for managing great enterprises, and the limitation of
the liability of investors, that it was deemed wise in this
country in order to prevent favoritism, to create corporations
by general laws and thus to afford to all who wished it, the
opportunity of assuming a corporate character in accordance
therewith. The result was a great increase in the number of
the corporations and the assumption of the corporate form by
seven-eighths of the active capital of the country. The great
saving in the cost of production brought about by mechanical
inventions and the organization of capital worked incalculable
benefit to the public, but the necessary price of it under our
system of free right of contract and inviolate rights of private
property was a division of the profit between those who were
.to consume the product and those whose minds conceived and
whose hands executed the work of production. The total
wealth of the whole country was thus enormously increased,
but of the increase more was necessarily accumulated in some
hands than others. In the general prosperity caused by the
revolution in methods of production, captains of industry
amassed fabulous fortunes, and the aggregations of capital
under corporate management became so great as to stagger
the imagination. In the mad rush for money which previous
successes had stimulated, it is not to be wondered at that
some of the accumulated wealth was corruptly used to secure
undue business advantages from legislative and executive
sources, and that many of the political agencies of the people

RECENT CRITICISM OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARV.

583

became tainted. The impersonal character of corporations
afforded a freedom from that restraint in the use of money for
political corruption, which is often present when the Would-be
briber is an individual. Men of good repute with complacence and intentional ignorance acquiesced in the use of
corporate funds to buy legislators and councilmen in the
corporate interest when they would not wish or dare to adopt
such methods in their individual business. The enormous
increase in corporate wealth furnished the means of corruption,
and the prospect of ill-gotten gains attracted the dishonest
trickster into politics and debauched the weak, while the honest
and courageous were often driven into private life. The Genie
of corruption in politics, which the corporations called up has
lived to plague them, and, although many great companies
have secured all they wish from legislative bodies, they are
regarded by the political blackmailers as fair game, and the
corruption fund is still maintained to prevent oppression. The
people not unjustly have charged these public evils to the
management of corporations,
Another evil has been the injustice done to the real owners
of corporate property by the reckless and dishonest management of its nominal owners. The great liberality -of the
general laws for the formation of corporations, and the entire
failure to exercise any stringent visitorial powers over them,
have enabled the active promoters and managers of large enterprises carried on at a distance from the homes of the real
owners to increase the corporate indebtedness and capital
stock so far beyond any fair valuation of their property. as to
put the entire control of it in the hands of the holders of
worthless stock, who have nothing at stake in the corporate
success. The real owners, the bondholders, are at the mercy
of this irresponsible management till insolvency comes. The
reckless business methods, which such an irresponsibility and
lack of supervision invite, create an unhealthy and feverish
competition in every market, wholly unrestrained by the
natural caution which the real owner of a business must
feel. The concern is kept going with no hope of legitimate
profit, but simply to pay large salaries, or to favor unduly
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some other enterprise in which the managers have a real
interest.
Another reason for popular distrust of corporate methods
is the use by corporations of great amounts of capital to
monopolize and control particular industries. It is my sincere
belief that no such control or monopoly can be maintained
permanently, unless it is buttressed by positive legislation giving an undue advantage over the public and competitors. Of
course, by close business methods and by improving all the
economical advantages which the manufacture of a commodity
on an enormous scale affords, the cost of production maybe so
reduced as to discourage competition on a smaller scale, but,
unless the fear of it performs the same useful office for the
benefit of the public by continuing the lowest profitable prices,
actual competition will certainly appear. Whatever the fate
such trusts may ultimately have, it has often happened that in
their formation and early history, the plan adopted has been
the forced buying out of every competitor or his ruin by underselling him at heavy loss, so as to put the public and the
market for a time at least at the mercy of one greedy corporate
concern. Such methods and such a result naturally fill the
people with anxious fears and a hostile feeling toward aggregations of corporate wealth.
In spite of these well-known evils, nothing can be clearer to a
calm, intelligent thinker than that under conditions of modern
society, corporations are indispensable both to the further
material progress of this country and to the maintenance of
that we have enjoyed. The evils must be remedied, but not
by destroying one of the greatest instruments for good that
social man has devised. Nevertheless, so strong has the
hostility to corporations become, especially in certain of the
Southern and Western states where the agricultural community is large, life is hard and wealth is rare, that any plan
which can be contrived to diminish the property of corporations, or to cripple their efficiency seems to meet with favor.
The feeling is especially directed against the railway corporations, although without their aid and presence, these very communities would be helpless and poor, indeed.
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The last decade in Europe has been prolific of doctrines and
theories for the amelioration of the human race by the abolition of private property and private capital, by the vesting of
all the means of production in the government for the benefit
of all the people, and by the distribution of the product according to fixed standards of merit. While socialism has not
obtained much of a foothold in this country as such, even in
those sections already referred to, schiemes which are necessarily socialistic in their nature are accepted planks in the
platform of a large political party. The underlying principle
of such schemes is that it is the duty of the Government to
equalize the inequalities which the rights of free contract and
private property have brought about, and by enormous outlay
derived as far as possible from the rich, to afford occupation
and sustenance to the poor. Howevei disguised such plans
of social and governmental reform are, they find their support
in the willingness of their advocates to transfer without any
compensation from one who has acquired, a large part of his
acquisition to those who have been less prudent, energetic and
fortunate.
This of course involves confiscation and the
destruction of the principle of private property.
Under the fourteenth amendment the question whether legislation and state action deprive any person of his property
without due process of law has become a Federal one, and by
the Act of 1875, it is cognizable by the Circuit Courts of the
United States.
The prejudices above adverted to have led to much legislation hostile to corporations both resident and non-resident. It
takes the form of discriminating taxation, of the regulation of
rates to be charged by those companies engaged in quasi
public business, and sometimes of the direct deprivation of
vested rights. In all such cases resort is at once had to the
inferior Federal courts by the corporations injuriously
affected, to test the validity of the state's action, and it not
infrequently happens that it becomes the duty of such courts
to declare void the legislation involved and to enjoin state
officers from seizing or injuring the property of corporations
under its provisions. Such a decision in a corporation-hating
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community at once tends to mark the Federal courts as
f:iends and protectors of corporations.
The repeated efforts of different state legislatures to impose

restrictions upon interstate commerce to secure some apparent
advantage to their own constituents, evidence the profound
wisdom of the framers of the constitution in vesting complete
control thereof in the National ,Government ; but the tribunals
whose jurisdiction is constantly invoked judicially to declare
void all such legislation, do not for the time commend themselves to the favor either of those who urged its passage or of
those who were to profit by its operation, and the fact that the
complainant in such litigation is frequently a railroad or transportation company, only confirms the view of the undue favor
of these courts to such litigants.
The jurisdiction of the Federal Judiciary does not end with
the enforcement of national laws in the interest of the whole
country against the temporary interest of a part. They are
are also required to administer justice between the citizens of
different states. It goes without saying, that this judicial
power was given to prevent the possibility of injustice from
local prejudice, and not because in every case it was supposed
to exist. The entire jurisdiction rests on the exceptional
instances, for in a great majority of cases the same results
would certainly be reached in the courts of the state as in the
Federal courts. But in those courts or states where there is
real danger from prejudice against a stranger, the same cause
which is likely to obstruct justice for the foreign suitor creates
a local feeling of resentment against the tribunal established to
defeat its effect. The capital invested in great enterprises in
the South and West is owned in the East or abroad, and the
corporations which use it are therefore frequently organized
in a different state from that in which the investment is made.
Such companies all carry their litigation into the Federal
courts on the ground of diverse citizenship with the opposing
party, and, in view of the deep-seated prejudice entertained
against them by the local population, it is not surprising that
they do. That in most, if not in all cases, the feeling that
prompts this avoidance of the state courts does great injustice
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to the state judiciary is undoubtedly true. In jury trials,
however, the fear of injustice from local prejudice is certainly
sometimes justified. In these same states where the narrow
provincial spirit is strong and local prejudices exist, there is
deep fear of the abuse of judicial power, and the legislation
of the state is directed to minimizing the influence and control
of the judge over the action and deliberation of the jury. The
extent to which this is carried was clearly set forth in an interesting article read before this association by Mr. Justice Brown
some years ago. The slightest circumstance, although furnishing but a scintilla of evidence to support the contention of
either party, requires the submission of the case to the jury.
The office of a judge is reduced to that of a mere moderator
of the trial. He is only permitted to lay down a few general
principles of law in advance of the argument, while the application of them to the facts of the case and conflicting evidence
is really committed to the zeal of contending counsel. The
tendency of such procedure is to leave to the unrestrained
impulses of the jury the settlement of all the issues of the case.
Though the injustice likely to result to corporations from this
procedure is manifest, the people of a locality where local
prejudice exists have come to think that they have a vested
right to the chances of success which it gives them in a suit
against such opponents. When, therefore, in controversies with
corporations of other states, they are carried before a court in
which the jury are not their friends and neighbors, and in which
the power is given to the judge to direct a verdict when the
evidence for either party is so slight that a contrary verdict must
be set aside, to comment on the evidence, to apply the law thereto,
and to make plain, if need be, what the legal sophistries of counsel and their inaccurate statements of the evidence may have
obscured, they feel that they are in a tribunal which they
should avoid and which the corporations should naturally
seek. The constant struggle of most corporations to avoid
state tribunals in the sections of the country referred to, and
to secure a Federal forum, even though it is followed by only
limited success in the result of the litigation, is chiefly the
cause for the popular impression in those states that the
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Federal courts are the friends of corporations and protectors of
their abuses.
Those abuses, however, really find their chief cause in
political corruption, which it is wholly beyond the power of
the Federal courts to prevent or eradicate. Too frequently
the popular impulse is to remedy or punish the evil by giving
judgment against the great corporations in every case, no
matter what the particular issues or facts are, on the ground
that the corporation has probably increased its capital or
attained its success by corrupt methods. It is hardly necessary to point out that this mode of punishment by forfeiture
and chance distribution cannot be countenanced in a court of
justice, however meritorious the cause of complaint upon which
it is founded.
Corporate corruption cannot be directly punished in the
Federal courts, because the bribery of which many corporations
are guilty is most difficult of legal proof and crimes of this character are usually committed against the state, so that Federal
courts have no cognizance of them. It has been wisely settled by the adjudication of all courts, state and Federal, that
the evils resulting from vesting in courts the power to set
aside otherwise lawful acts of the legislature for alleged corruption in their passage, would exceed even the wrong done
by such legislation, because of the uncertainty it would give
to the binding effect of all laws and the overwhelming influence such power to inquire into legislative motives would give
the judicial branch of the government in respect of all legislative action.
The abuses which too liberal charters and insufficient visitorial power permit, are either for the state legislatures or for
the state executive and courts, by quo swamtto, to correct and
remedy. State laws, which should forbid the issue of stock
or the issue of bonds by any corporation until after an examination by a state board of supervision into the affairs of the
company and a certificate that the assets justify it, would do
much in this direction. The Federal courts can do nothing to
prevent such abuses, and their action is not usually invoked until
the evil is done, and only a bankrupt estate is left to administer,
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The combinations known as trusts are now before the state
courts, and I have no doubt from their decisions that legislation which experience will suggest, both by way of supervision over corporations and by criminal laws. will suppress
much of their evil methods. It is settled and rightly settled,
I submit, that the national government can do nothing in this
direction, except where such trusts are for the purpose of
directly controlling interstate commerce.
The main public evil of corporate growth, the corruption
of politics, must be reformed by the people and not by the
courts. Courts are but conservators ; they cannot effect great
social or political changes. Corporations there must be if we
would progress; accumulation of wealth there will be if
private property continues the keystone of our society; the
temptation to use money to corrupt legislatu'res and other
political agencies will remain potent as long as undue
privilege for corporations can be thus secured. The only
real remedy is in the purification of the politics of the
country, and the ,selection of incorruptible public servants.
Dark as the prospect sometimes seems for such a change,
we must not and need not despair. Public opinion is sound,
the great heart of the American people is honest, and slowly
but surely the light is breaking in on them. The adoption of civil service reform in Federal, state and municipal
government is as certain to come as the nation is to live, and
with its complete establishment the end of those indispensable
assistants of successful political corruption, the machine and
its boss, will cease to be. The mad rush for wealth, the
-fevered condition of business and the opportunity for making
sudden fortunes have taken the attention of the more intelligent people from politics and made them blind or callous to
political abuses. With their greater ability to see and appreciate the dangers of the republic, their share of the blame for
present conditions is greater. But there are many signs of a
quickened public conscience and of a willingness on the part
of the intelligent and the pure to interest themselves in
politics for their country's good.
The present successful use of corrupt methods by corpora-
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tions is directly due to the neglect of the people to exercise
the eternal watchfulness which is the price of pure government ; but those whose interest it is to secure popular support
and who are willing to secure it by appeals to prejudice do not
tell the people unpleasant truths, and are glad to find a scapegoat for the people's sins in the Federal Judiciary. It well
rounds a rhetorical period to point to the Federal Judiciary as
an irresponsible and irremovable body, wholly out of touch
with the people and conniving at corporate abuses.
To an impartial observer it must seem remarkable that
judges should conceive a love for soulless corporations and
unduly favor them. Living as most of these judges do on
their salaries and deriving no profit from corporate investments,
they would seem to find little in their lives to blind them to
the injustice of any claim or defence which a wealthy corporation may make.
If it were conceded that greed of power is an incentive so
strong that Federal judges have yielded to it and have
extended their jurisdiction over corporations beyond the lines
marked by the constitution and the laws, this is far from
establishing that justice has not been meted out to corporate
suitors with impartial hand. The fact is that when we come
to examine in detail the charges against the Federal courts,
the burden of them is that they have assumed jurisdiction over
corporate litigation without constitutional and legal right, and
not that, in the hearing on the merits, corporations have been
unduly favored. The latter is always assumed as a granted
premise when the former is deemed to be established.
Having pointed out some of the reasons why the jurisdiction
of the Federal courts in respect to corporations, be it exercised
never so impartially, must under existing conditions arouse deep
prejudice against them, and call forth severe assaults upon their
conduct and motives, I come now to examine more in detail
the charges which have been made by those who attempt specifications.
The first is that the Supreme Court in holding, in the Dartmouth College case, the legislative charter of a corporation to
be a contract, the repeal of which was the impairment of its
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obligation and was inhibited by the Federal constitution, committed a fundamental error, induced thereto by greed of jurisdiction, and thus furnished to corporations the means of maintaining and enjoying corruptly purchased privileges. I do not
propose to discuss this much criticised case because it was
decided in 182o, and has now nothing but an historical interest;
for no charter has been granted for years which does not contain

a clause permitting its repeal or amendment. and a court could
hardly give a wider scope to such a reservatiin clause in favor
of the state's power than that which the Supreme Court of the
United States gave in the Greenwood Freight Company case.
With reference to the accusation that it was greed of Jurisdiction which induced the court to hold that the revocation of a
grant by a state was the impairment of a contract and so within
the Federal constitution, it should be said that the people of
the United States, instead of condemning this assumption of
jurisdiction have by subsequent amendment expressly extended
the Federal Judicial power to the cognizance of state aggression upon all vested rights whether resting in grant, contract
or otherwise.
And this suggests the charge against the Supreme Court
that it improperly seized additional corporate jurisdiction in its
holding that the fourteenth amendment forbidding a state to
deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law protects the property of corporations as well as
that of natural persons. It is difficult to see how any other
result could have been reached. For, even if artifical persons
are not referred to in the amendment, natural persons .necessarily have vested rights in the property of corporations. It
is said that the construction should have been limited so as to
exclude corporations because the moving cause was only to
give national protection to a newly freed race. In the light of
the general language of the amendment, this would have been
a narrow construction indeed, and one which nothing could
have justified except the conviction now firmly held and
declared in some quarters, that Federal jurisdiction to preserve
any rights, even those declared in Magna Charta, is an unmitigated evil to be avoided by interpretation however strained.
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And yet the Supreme Court is attacked with invective and
epithet by the same critics for refusing to hold in the Sugar
Trust case that the power to regulate interstate commerce
includes within it the power to inhibit the purchase by one
company of substantially all the plants for refining sugar in
this country with the purpose of controlling its sugar markets.
To extend the Federal regulation of interstate commerce to
that of the purchase of the means of producing a commodity
which, when produced, is to be the subject of commerce both
state and interstate, requires a construction of the interstate
commerce clause so broad that, if accepted, it would have
been difficult to fix a limit beyond which Congress might not
go in its control of mercantile business and manufacturing in
every community. It would have seemed to give some ground
for.the charge so often made that, through Federal judicial
decisions, rights of the states are being absorbed in the
national government.
As I have already said, the burden of the specifications
against the Federal Judiciary is not that they unduly favor
corporations in the hearing of cases, but that they have improperly given corporations opportunities to avoid the state
courts by resorting to the Federal courts. Hence the decisions
of the Supreme Court, by which corporations organized in one
state and sueing or being sued in another are permitted to
select the Federal courts as a forum, have been the subject of
the severest animadversion, and the judges rendering the
decisions are charged with having been consciously guilty of
flagrant usurpation and with intentional violation of the law
and the constitution. When corporations first appeared in the
Federal courts, it was held that a corporation was not a citizen
within the meaning of the judiciary act or the constitution, and
that Federal jurisdiction asserted on the ground of diverse
citizenship, in a cause to which a corporation was a party,
must depend on the citizenship of the stockholders or members of the corporation. As it had also been ruled that the
words of the judiciary act giving circuit courts jurisdiction in
every suit between a citizen of the state where it was brought,
and the citizen of another state only included suits where all
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the parties on one side were of different citizenship from that
of all of those on the other, the result was that no corporation
could resort to a Federal court unless all its stockholders
were citizens of another state from that in which the suit was
brought, and the ownership of one share by a resident of the
same state with that of the opposing party ousted the jurisdiction. And this, the Supreme Court held until 1844. In that
year the question arose again, and the court held that, for
purposes of Federal jurisdiction, a corporation was a citizen
of the state which created it, and soon thereafter laid down
the doctrine, always followed since, that the members of a
corporation are to be conclusively presumed to be citizens
of the state of its creation. This conclusive presumption was
a fiction, adopted, as Mr. Justice BRADLEY has explained,
to avoid the difficulty and injustice caused by the frequent
appearance in such cases of a single resident stockholder.
It was in effect a changed construction of the judiciary act
for reasons which had not forcibly presented themselves to
the court when the question first arose. It was certainly true
that when corporations, organized in other states than that
where suit was brought, appeared in litigation, they represented
members, a great majority of whom were either citizens of
other states or aliens. If any local prejudice was likely to
have effect against a non-resident natural person, it certainly
would have effect against a corporation from another state,
and the ownership of a few shares of its stock by a resident
would not obviate it. The result reached by the decisions
was quite within the constitutional grant of Federal judicial
power, for that covers all controversies between citizens of
different states, and it is immaterial whether in such controversies are also involved, on both sides, citizens of the same state.
There was such a real difference for the practical purposes
of a trial and the bearing of local prejudice upon it between
a suit by or against a foreign corporate body with one or
more resident stockholders, whose identity was lost in that of
the corporate party litigant, and a suit by or against parties to
the record who were natural persons, some of them residents
and others non-residents, that the exception made in respect
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to corporations in the established construction of the judiciary act would seem sound and reasonable.
The holding that a foreign or non-resident corporation
must be excluded from resort to a Federal forum, because it
had one or more resident stockholders would practically
deprive the owners of nearly all foreign capital to be invested
in the newer states of the Union of any opportunity to sue or
defend in the Federal courts, because, in the nature of things,
their capital must assume a corporate form, and in companies
with thousands of shares of capital stock transferable without
restriction, a share or two, at least, would be sure to find its
way into the possession of a resident owner. And yet the
reason for the constitutional provision applied more strongly
to such corporate investments than to those of non-resident
natural persons.
The ruling was directly in the interest of the new states
who were thirsting for foreign capital, because it removed one
of the hindrances to its coming. It was, therefore, exactly in
accord with the intention of the constitution. It gives but a
contracted view of the purpose of the framers of that instrument in providing a tribunal between citizens of difforent
states, which was equally related to both, to regard it solely
from the standpoint of the non-resident and as intended
only to secure a benefit for him. It is crediting them with a
much more statesmanlike object to say, that while the provision was, of course, intended to avoid actual injustice from
local prejudice, its more especial purpose was to allay the
fears of such injustice in the minds of those whose material
aid was necessary in developing the commercial intercourse
between the states, and thus to induce such intercourse and
the investment of capital owned by citizens of one state in
another. In this light, it is only one of several provisions of
the constitution intended to prevent unnecessary and prejudiced restraints upon interstate commerce, and it confers more
benefit upon those against whose prejudice it is intended as a
shield than upon those whose interests are directly protected.
The decisions under discussion were made by the Supreme
Court in the days of Chief Justice TANEY, and with his con-
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currence at a time when its members are now thought to
have been inclined toward a narrower construction of the
constitution and Federal jurisdiction and powers than their
predecessors.
Moreover, the people of the United States for fifty years
have acquiesced in this holding. In the last half century, it
has always been within the power of Congress by two lines
of legislation to reverse it, and, although, during that period,
the party of strict construction and state's rights was for years
in control of Congress, and the judiciary act was four times
substantially amended, the decisions remain the law of the land.
When it requires a constitutional amendment to correct or
restrain an unwarranted assumption of power by a court, the
machinery for securing it is so cumbersome that the failure by
this means to restrain the court is not a conclusive argument
in favor of the people's acquiescence in the court's assertion
of jurisdiction. But where, as in the present case, the issue
was merely one of construing a statute, the failure of Congress for half a century to amend or overrule the construction
given isas strong an argument as can be adduced to justify
the action of the court,, and would, in this case, seem to be the
best possible refutation of the severe charge that the Judges,
who made these decisions, were guilty of flagrant and intentional usurpation.
If it is true that citizens of one state organize corporations under the laws of another state to do business
in the former state, and thereby carry controversies with their
fellow citizens into the Federal courts, this is an abuse which
should be remedied by Congress as other frauds upon the
jurisdiction have been provided against.
The Federal courts have also been severely arraigned for
undue amplification of their powers in the matter of receivers
of railroad companies, due as it is charged to their leaning
toward such co-porations and a desire to protect them. This
count of the general indictment against the Federal Judiciary
is more fully and elaborately treated in a memorial presented
to Congress by the Legislature of South Carolina, than anywhere else. The occasion for the protest was the commit-
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ments for contempt by the Circuit Court of the United States
sitting in South Carolina of certain state officers. In one case
the contemnors were taxing officers who, though they knew
the property to be in the hands of the receiver of the Federal
court, without any application to the court, seized it for taxes.
In the other case, a constable without search warrant broke
into the warehouse of a railroad in the hands of the court's
receiver and seized a cask of liquor on the ground that it had
been transported into the state contrary to the provisions of
the state dispensary law. The cask had been imported before
the dispensary law went into effect and had been held by the
receiver because the whereabouts of the consignee could not
be discovered. The circumstances in each of these cases
rather indicate a desire on the part of the state authorities to
seek a conflict with the Federal court than an aggressive and
domineering spirit in the latter. When the state authorities
in a decent and orderly way subsequently applied to the court
for an order upon the receiver to pay the taxes, the objections
of the receiver were heard and overruled and an order made
upon him to pay.
The deep spirit of distrust of the Federal courts in which
the memorial is written may be inferred from one of its concluding sentences, in which the Federal courts of equity are
referred to as " having been degraded to their present position of being feared by the patriotic and avoided by the
honest." We are permitted to conjecture that the memorialists were not wholly unbiassed in discussing the decisions
of the Federal courts and their integrity and standing, when
we read the statement in the inaugural address of the present
Governor of the state, who was one of the signers of the
memorial, that he and the men to whom he was speaking in
this year of grace, 1895, were " South Carolinians by birth
and choice, Southerners on principle and Americans by force
of circumstances."
The main purpose of the memorial was to show that the
practice of Federal courts of equity in appointing receivers to
-operate railroads is a usurpation of authority wholly without
warrant in the English High Court of Chancery, by the pro-
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cedure in which, the scope of equitable remedies in the Federal
courts is usually governed. To establish this, the memorialists
relied chiefly on the judgment of Lord Cairns in the Court of
Chancery appeals in the case of Gardner v. the Londont
Chatham & Dover' Colnpanj,, in which the order of the ViceChancellor appointing a manager of the defendant railway on
the application of a mortgagee of the railway tolls was
reversed. The judgment was placed upon two grounds, first,
that the mortgage gave no right of sale and liquidation, so
that the order was really for a permanent management of a
going business, while the practices in courts of equity justified
the appointment of receivers only until a sate and liquidation; and, second, that by the charter of the company the
franchises were personal and non-assignable, and could not
be exercised by a receiver. The first reason has little or
no application to the vast majority of cases, in which railroad receivers have been appointed in this country, for generally the remedy sought has been a sale and liquidation, and
the receiver has thus been appointed to serve only until
the sale. The second ground of the judgment does not
relate to the competency of a court of equity to manage a
railroad or other going business through an agent, Pendente
litc, but only to the assignability of franchises, and it furnishes
as little support as the first ground to the claims of the
memorial. The power to mortgage conferred by statute on
railway companies in this country usually contains express
authority to mortgage both the railroad and the franchises to
operate it. The necessary implications from this are the right
to sell the franchises with the road at a foreclosure sale, and
the power of the court in which foreclosure proceedings are
had, to preserve the property with its assignable franchises by
temporary custody and operation of the road under such
franchises pending the sale.
By reference to Lord Justice BAGGALLAY'S judgment in the
case of the Manclicster & .31iford Ry. Co., 14 Ch. D. 657, it
appears that the result in Gardner's Case was a surprise to the
profession, and was in conflict with the practice of appointing
managers in such cases which had been in vogue in the
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chancery courts of England for ten years previous, and which
had had the sanction of so great a chancery lawyer as Lord
HATHERLY.
Moreover, no sooner was the decision announced
in the Gardner Case, than Parliament passed an act expressly
authorizing the appointment of railroad managers by the court
of chancery, showing that, in the opinion of Parliament, jurisdiction to manage railroads, pending litigation over them, by
officers of the court was a power that courts of equity should
have, if they did not already have it.
The charge of usurpation in the appointment of receivers
becomes still less maintainable when we consider the history
of receiverships in this country. Gardner's Case was decided in 1866. As much as ten years before this, the
Supreme Court of the United States in Covington Drawbridge
Co. v. Shepard, 21 How. I 12, had referred to the practice in
the English court of chancery to order a receiver to be
appointed to manage railways and other corporate property,
to take the proceeds of the franchises and to apply them to
pay the creditors filing the bill, and had approved and adopted
it in the case of a bridge company. Thereafter receivers were
appointed for railways and it had become a settled practice
not only in the Federal courts but in state courts when
Gardner's Case was decided. Even if that case cannot be
reconciled with the practice of appointing receivers under the
conditions existing in this country, as i have attempted to
show it can be, there would still seem to be no binding or
jurisdictional obligation on courts of the United States to
reverse their settled procedure of ten years standing based on
English precedent to accord with a new and unexpected
ruling in the English courts, and one the effect of which was
immediately done away with by an act of Parliament restoring the old practice.
The appointment of receivers to operate railroads pending
suits in foreclosure and creditor's bills, instead of being an
abuse of authority by the Federal courts was a most commendable use of an ordinary equitable means of preserving
the status quo with respect to a new kind of property and a
pressing emergency. Generally no one but the parties are
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interested in preserving the subject matter of the suit as a
going concern till it can be sold, but in the case of a railroad
the public are even more interested than the parties in having
this done. It is mentioned in the South Carolina memorial as
a measure of the abuse of Federal jurisdiction in this regard
that one-fifth of the railroad mileage in the United States is in
the hands of Federal court receivers. Considering the severity
of the times and the suicidal cutting of rates by railroad companies for the purpose of securing business, I do not know
thatthis proportion unfairly indicates the number of embarrassed
and bankrupt roads in this country, but it is *hardto see why
it is an argument against the appointment of receivers to
operate them. The disastrous consequences to the whole
country, were these great arteries of the Nation to cease to
flow, can hardly be overstated; and yet, unless in the course
of liquidation sale and reorganization, they could, when insolvent, be withdrawn from liability to seizure and dismemberment by ordinary executions in the various jurisdictions which
they traverse, their operation would become impossible. The
ordinary insolvent laws of each state, even if their procedure
had been at all adapted to the running of railroads, as it was
not, would have supplied in such case but a poor substitute
for the present receivership. Most railroads are to-day interstate, and the advantage of an ad interim management under
practically the same jurisdiction on both sides of state lines is
apparent. In the absence of statutory provision for-such an
exigency, the flexible procedure of a court of equity is fitted
to meet it, and although the remedy was adopted soon after
the building of railroads, more than forty years ago, and has
been applied with increasing frequency ever since, it has not
been deemed necessary by Congress or state legislatures to
provide any other means for bridging the undoubted difficulties presented by the insolvency of railroad companies.
One of the greatest objections urged to receiverships in the
South Carolina memorial is that it removes the railroad property
from local jurisdictions. But this objection would be incident
to any imaginable temporary management of the railroad
pending proceedings to sell and distribute proceeds. The
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injury to the sovereignty of the state involved in the requirement that its taxing officers shall make application to the
Federal court having custody of property for an order for the
payment of the taxes due upon it, instead of violently taking
it out of the court's possession, is one that must be charged
to the Constitution of the United States, to the supremacy of
the Federal jurisdiction where it conflicts with that of the
state therein declared, and to the circumstances by the force
of which South Carolina is still in this country. The charge
that in appointing receivers the Federal courts abolish the
ight of trial by jury in great stretches of country is untrue,
for by the statute of 1887 suit may be brought against a
receiver without leave of court, and this permits a suit at law
with all its incidents. The fear entertained that the management by the Federal courts of property worth $1,300,000,000,
without responsibility, would lead to malversation of funds,
and corruption does not seem to be justified by the history of
Federal receiverships. The fact is, that no-possible system of
managing railroads could be better adapted to a summary
investigation of the details of the management than that by a
,court of equity in which the court will always and at once
entertain complaints by anyone in interest against its receiver
and examine the facts upon which they rest. This may
account, in part, for the very few instances of official corruption among Federal receivers.
On the other hand, if any other and better way can be
devised for the temporary management of insolvent railroads
pending their sale, it may be conceded that there are substantial reasons for relieving Federal courts of equity from the duty.
The business has grown to such an extent that regular judicial
labors are much interfered with by the consideration of mere
questions of railroad management. Unpleasant public controversies often follow in the wake of receiverships, having a tendency to put the court iri the attitude of a party. The more or
less complete dependence of the court upon the receivers in
matters of policy and the possibility that this confidence may be
misplaced make thejurisdiction an irksome one. The immunity
enjoyed by a receiver and a railroad in his charge from ordin-
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ary process i r-ein is very attractive to struggling railroad
owners and friendly litigation is often begun merely to secure
a receiver and tide over a stringency in the interest of all concerned. With no one in interest to oppose the appointment or
to move its discharge after it is made, a receiver is secured and
he is continued as long as all parties do not object, and do not
press the cause to final disposition. Courts usually have' so
much to attend to that they do not and cannot investigate the
weight or validity of reasons for delay in causes when not
brought to their attention by complaint of some of the parties.
Meantime the receivership is maintained and the irritation incident to the withdrawal of the railroad from local jurisdictions is
continued. The work of managing the road is saddled uponthe court pending the coming of a time when a reorganization
may be agreed upon or a better price obtained. I sympathize
heartily with ever), effort to impose a practical limitation upofi
the duration of receiverships. The use of the, courts as a
harbor of refuge from creditors during a financial- storm may
be abused, and doubtless has been. The temptation to this
resort is greatly increased if, as is too often the practice, the
controlling officer of the company is continued in the management as receiver. The patronage incident to the jurisdiction
is one of its evils. Recognizing this and wishing to avoid a
disagreeable controversy over place, courts usually acquiesce
in the-appointment of a person recommended by the parties,
who is not infrequently the president or manager of the company, and whose failure to oppose the receivership, it may be,
has been secured by such a recommendation. - Consent applications for receiverships would be much less common if it
were provided by statute that, wherever a case is made on
preliminary application for the immediate appointment of a
receiver, the clerk or marshal should act as temporary receiver
for thirty days, with a fixed per diem compensation, at which
time a permanent receiver, not an officer of the court, should
be selected by the court after full notice to all parties, and
that no one connected with the previous management of the
railroad or interested in its bonds or stock should be
eligible, even with consent of the parties. It has some
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times seemed to me that by virtue of the power to
pass a bankrupt law, and to regulate interstate commerce,
a national bureau for the sale of the assets of insolvent interstate railroads and their ad interiuz operation might be established, something like that now provided for National banks,
and that the executive head of such a bureau might be better
able to speed the sale of the railroads and shorLen the duration
of their official management than courts. When, however,
one attempts to formulate a system which shall have the flexibility of the present procedure and its adaptibility for preserving
the real status qua during the adjustment, one is obliged to
admit that the court management pendente lie has adv-antages
over any other, anomalous in some resoects as it may seem.
Probably this explains the failure of Congress or the state
legislatures to provide any other system, and even the zealous
South Carolina memorialists in their recommendation to Congress were unable to point out a better way than court receiverships with a few minor limitations. In any event, until some
new way is devised for the temporary operation of railroads,
pending insolvency or foreclosure and sale, courts must
assume it, and it ill becomes any one to criticise their action in
doing so, and to charge it to their greed of power, when any
other course would result in disastrous consequences to the
parties in interest and the country at large.
On the whole, when the charges made against Federal
courts of favoritism toward corporations are stripped of their
rhetoric and epithet, and the specific instances upon which the
charges are founded are reviewed, it appears that the action
of the courts complained of was not only reasonable but
rested on precedents established decades ago and fully
acquiesced in since, and that the real ground of the complaint
is that the constitutional and statutory jurisdiction of the
Federal courts is of such a character that it is frequently
invoked by corporations to avoid some of the manifest
injustice which a justifiable hostility to the corrupt methods
of many of them inclines legislatures and juries and others to
inflict upon all of them.
We come finally to the relation of the Federal cour..s to
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organized labor. The capitalist and laborer share the profit
of production. The more capital in active employment, the
more work there is to do, and the more work there is to do,
the more laborers are needed. The greater need of laborers,
the better their pay per man.. It is clearly in the interest of
those who work that capital shall increase more rapidly than
they do. Everything, therefore, having a legitimate tendency
to increase the accumulation of wealth and its use for production wi!l.give each workingman a larger share of the joint
result of capital and labor, and it is in a large measure, because
this country has grown more rapidly in capital than in population, that wages have steadily increased. But while it is in the
common interest of labor and capital to increase the fruits of
production, yet in determining the share of each their interests
are plainly opposed. Though the law of supply and demand.
will doubtless, in the end, be the most potent influence in fixing this division, yet during the gradual adjustment. to the
changing markets and the varying financial conditions, capital
wil! surely have the advantage, .unless labor takes united
action. During the betterment of business conditions,
organized labor, if acting with reasonable discretion, can
secure much greater promptness in the advance of wages,
than if it were left to the slower operation of natural laws
and, in the same way, as hard times come on, the too eager
employer may be restrained from undue haste in reducing
wages. The organization of capital into corporations with
the position of advantage, which this gave in a dispute with
single laborers over wages, made it absolutely necessa.ry for
labor to unite to maintain itself. For instance, how could
workingmen, dependent on each day's wages for living, dare
to take a stand, which might leave them without employment
if they had not by small assessments accumulated a common
fund for their support during such emergency? In union
they must sacrifice some independence of action, and there
are bad result8 from the tyranny of the majority in such
cases, but the hardships which have followed impulsive resort
to extreme measures have had a good effect to lessen these.
Experience, too, will lead to classification among the members

604

RECENT CRITICISM OF THE FEDERAL

JUDICIARY.

so that the cause of the skilled and worthy shall not be leveled
down to that of the lazy and neglectful. Like corporations
labor organizations do great good and much evil. The more
conservatively and intelligently conducted they are, the more
benefit they confer on their members. The more completely
they yield to the dominion of those among them who are
intemperate of expression and violent and lawless in their
methods, the more evil they do to themselves and society.
Unfortunately, there are large organizations of the latter class
and, in the heat of a bitter contest with employers, rights of
person and property are.sometimes openly violated in avowed
support of the cause of Lbor. The infiactions of the law
actual and threatened are palpable, and the interference of the
courts by their usual prccesses to prevent irreparable injury
to business and property becomes necessary. Such judicial
action often results in discouraging the whole movement and
brings down upon the courts the fierce denunciations of the
defeated leaders and arouses th:: hostility' of many who would
not join in the open breaches of the law, and vet so sympathize with the cause as to blind them to the necessity of
the suppression of such lawlessness.
The employees of railroad companies and others engaged in
transportation of freight and passengers generally have well
organized unions, and the controversies arising over wages
and other issues have been many. A vast majority of these
have been settled without extreme measures through the conservative influence of level-headed labor leaders and railroad
managers, but in the last twenty rears there have been some
very extended railroad stril,:e. accompanied by the boycotts
and open violence with which society has now become familiar.
The fact that many railroads have been operated by Federal
receivers, the non-residence of railway corporations in the states
where the strikes occur, and the interstate crnmerce feature of
the business, have brought some of these violations of property
and private and public right within the cognizance of Federal
courts. Because the participants in such contests have been
spread more widely over the country than in similar contests
with which State courts have had to deal, the action of the
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Federal courts in these cases has attracted more public attention and evoked more bitter condemnation by those who
naturally sympathize with labor in every controversy with
capital.
The efficacy of the processes of a court of equity to prevent:
much of the threatened injury from the public and private
nuisances which it is often the purpose of the leaders of such
stikes to cause, has led to the charge, which is perfectly true,
that judicial action has been much more efficient to restrain
labor excesses than corporate evils and greed.. If it were possible by the quick blow of an injunction to strike down the
conspiracy against public and private rights involved in the
corruption of a legislature or a council, Federal and other
courts would not be less prompt to use the remedy than they
are to restrain unlawful injuries by labor unions. But I have
had occasion to point out that the nature of corporate wrQng
is almost wholly beyond the reach of courts, especially those
of the United States. The corporate miners and sappers of
public virtue do not work in the open, but under cover; their
purposes are generally accomplished before they are known
to exist, and the traces of their evil paths are destroyed and
placed beyond the possibility of legal proof. On the other
hand, the chief wrongs committed by labor unions are the
open defiant trespass upon property rights and.violations of
public order, which the processes of courts are well adapted
both to punish and prevent.
The operation of the interstate commerce law is an illustration of the greater difficulty courts have in suppressing corporate violations of law than those of trade unions' The
discrimination between shippers by rebates and otherwise,
which it is the main purpose of the law to prevent, is almost
as difficult of detection and proof as bribery, for the reason
that both participants are anxious to avoid its disclosure; but
when the labor unions, as they sometimes do, seek to interfere
with interstate commerce and to obstruct its flow, they are
prone to carry out their purposes with such a blare of trumpets
and such open defiance of law that the proof of their guilt is
out of their own mouths. The rhetorical indictment against the
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Federal courts, that from that which was intended as a shield
against corporate wrong, they have forged a weapon to attack
the wage earner, is in this way given a specious force which a
candid observer will be blind to ignore. Thus are united in
a common enmity against the Federal courts the populist and
the trade unionist with all those whose political action is likely
to be affected by such a combination. And yet their enmity
has no other justification than the differing and unavoidable
limitations upon the efficacy of judicial action in respect to
corporate and labor evils.
As a matter of fact there is nothing in any Federal decision
directed against the organization of labor to maintain wages
and to secure terms of employment otherwise favorable. The
courts so far as they have expressed themselves on the subject
recognize the right of men for a lawful purpose to combine to
leave their employment at the same time, and to use the inconvenience this may cause to their employer as a legitimate
weapon in the frequently recurring controversy as to the
-amount of wages. It is only when the combination is for an
unlawful purpose and an unlawful injury is thereby sought to
be inflicted, that the combination has received the condemnation of the Federal as well as of state courts.
The action of the Federal courts all over the country in the
recent American Railway Union strike in issuing injunctions to
prevent further unlawful interference by the strikers with the
-carrying of the mails, and the flow of interstate commerce,
followed by the commitment for contempt of the strike leaders
who defied the injunction served on them, is what has called
out the official protests of the Governors of Illinois and Colorado, and the phrase "Government by Injunction " has been
invented to describe the alleged usurpation of power by the
Federal tribunals in this crisis.
When the history of the great strike shall be written in
years to come, the absurd expectations and purpose of its projeztors and their marvellous success in deluding a myriad of
followers into their active support will seem even more difficult
of explanation than it does to-day. The mind' that could
conceive and so far execute the plan of taking the entire popu-
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lation of this country by the throat to compel them to effect
the settlement of a local labor trouble in Chicago, was that of
a genius however misdirected. The Governor of Illinois, who
coined the phrase "government by injunction," says that the
Federal courts have added legislative and executive functions
to their ordinary judicial office, in that they have declared in
their orders of injunction that to be unlawful which was lawful
before, and have sought to enforce obedience to such orders
by an army of marshals and soldiers. It is a little difficult
to understand the working of a mind having the discipline of
a legal training and the experience of judicial service which
can honestly and sincerely maintain (and I do not wish to
impugn the sincerity, of the Governor of Illinois) that the
combination described in the bill in the Debs Case and
enjoined in the order of injunction was not unlawful. If it
was not so, then there is no law in this country securing the
right of private property, no law authorizing the Federal
Government to operate the mails, no law by which the regulation of interstate commerce is vested in the General Government. A public nuisance more complete in all its features
than that which Debs and his colleagues were engaged in
furthering cannot be imagined. Such nuisances have been
frequently enjoined by courts of equity on the bill of the
Attorney-General. Was there any doubt that Debs proposed
to continue his unlawful course unless restrained ? Was there
any doubt that the injury would be irreparable and could not
be compensated for by verdict at law ? Was it for, the court
to hesitate to issue its process because it had reason to believe
that it would not be obeyed ? The novelty involved in the
application of such a remedy to such an injury was not that
injuries of the same general character had not before been restrained by injunction, but only that never before in the history
of the courts had injuries of this kind been so enormous and
far reaching in their effect. It was not that men had not before
been ordered by process of court to desist from such injuries,
but never before had so many men been engaged in inflicting
them. Nor can it affect the power of Federal courts to remedy
wrongs within their lawful cognizance because the wrong
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would have been prevented if the executive of another sovereignty than that under which they are constituted had acted
promptly to suppress it. The Federal courts did not assume
executive powers any more than they do so when they issue
any process to the Marshal and the Marshal as the subordinate
of the President executes it. The extent of the actual and
threatened injury and the possible resistance to lawful process
required the Marshal to call to his assistance much aid, but it
is a latter day doctrine that a court is usurping the executive
function, in calling upon the executive to use additional force
to avoid a possible defeat of its lawful process. The conservative course of the President and the Attorney-General in first
applying to the courts for process and the subsequent firmness
exhibited by those officers in executing that process by all the
means available will cause the country to hold them always in
grateful remembrance. The duty of the courts to act on this
initiative was so plain that while it does not entitle them to any
especial commendation, it would seem that it should protect
them from serious attack.
The real objection to the injunction is the certainty that
disobedience will be promptly punished before a court without
a jury. It is hardly necessary to defend the necessity for
such means of enforcing orders of court. If the court must
wait upon the slow course of a jury trial before it can compel
a compliance with its order, then the sanction of its process
would be seriously impaired. Has any injustice been done to
Debs in his trial by the court? Is there the slightest doubt
in the mind of his fiercest supporter that he violated the
injunction? Why, then, complain of his conviction before
a tribunal authorized to try him ? The argument seems to be
that because many men are determined to violate the rights of
the public and their fellow-citizens in spite of the lawful orders
of the Federal court restraining them from so doing, they
should, on account of their number and popular strength,
have a right which no Anglo-Saxon has hitherto ever enjoyed,
to interpose a jury trial between them and the enforcement of
a court's order. If the criticisms under consideration are
directed against the existence of courts, then their weight
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depends on different considerations from those which apply on
the assumption that courts are to be maintained for the purpose of remedying wrongs. But they are professedly based
on the Constitution of the United States and that certainly
contemplates courts, whose decrees shall be enforced, however,
much resisted, and which shall not be merely advisory'coun-.
.cils whose efficacy depends on their powers of persuasion.
I am aware that there were many conservative unprejudiced
;and patriotic citizens in this country, many of them members
of the Bar and of this association whose anxiety that the
-Chicago riots should be suppressed was as great as that of any
.one, and yet who were of opinion that the action of the
Federal courts in issuing the injunctions, which were issued
on the application of the Attorney-General were an unwise
stretching of an equitable remedy to meet an emergency which
should have been met in other ways. To all such persons, I
-commend the reading of Mr. Justice BREWER'S opinion in the
Debs Case. It is a great judgment of a great court, and
makes it as clear as midday that the process therein issued
was justified by every precedent, and was the highest duty of the
court. The exercise of that duty has, however, only increased
the number of those who sincerely believe that the Federal
c3urts are constituted to foster corporate evils and to destroy all
effort by labor to maintain itself in its controversies with corporate capital.
I have reached the end of a much too long disctssion of
:he relation of the Federal Judiciary to some of the important
issues of the day. It will not be surprising if the storm of
abuse' heaped upon the Federal courts and the political
strength of popular groups whose plans of social reform have
met obstruction in those tribunals shall lead to serious efforts
through legislation to cut down their jurisdiction and cripple
their efficiency. If this comes, then the responsibility for its
effects, whether good or bad, must be' not only with those
who urge the change but also with those who do not strive to
resist its coming.
The earlier assaults upon the Federal Judiciary and their
harmless character in the light of the event reconciles one to

